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Accounting demographic-economic relations are developed to analyze the impacts of 
changes in unemployment, in the age of retirement and in fertility, on economic dependency 
and on earnings per capita. In general, the magnitude of the first two, and both the size and 
direction of the third of these effects depend on the population and the labor force age 
distribution; these relations are formally expressed, and a decomposition of the changes in 
dependency and income due to each one of their factors is carried out in six Latin American 
countries. The results vary substantially across countries in regard to changes in 
unemployment and fertility, but are relatively uniform regarding the changes in the age at 
retirement. The analysis suggests that most of the countries of the Latin American region 
have not reached to date the stage where small reductions in fertility would be clearly 
detrimental to dependency and per capita income, although all are experiencing negative 
ageing effects in varying degrees. An application to the study of transfer pension systems 
indicates that the legal age at retirement would have to increase substantially in some 
countries in order to compensate for anticipated population ageing, and thus complementary 
measures are called for if their system’s financial balance is not to deteriorate further.
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Introduction.
Demographic patterns have been changing rapidly in many Latin American countries, and 
public concerns are expressed with some frequency in relation to the negative economic 
implications of population growth on the one band, and ageing on the other, , specially in 
connection with the current financial difficulties experienced by social security systems. In 
contrast to the public interest in these matters whithin the region, evaluations of the 
economic consequences of changing population age profiles are largely absent from recent 
research and policy analyses, with a few exceptions (e.g., Uthoff, 1990, 1991). Doubtless 
there are many factors that contribute to this, including some of political and institutional 
nature. Inadequacies of the existing large-scale, long run planning models (Arthur &  
Mcnicoll, 1975) that are often exceedingly complex and yield results that are difficult to 
interpret or to validate, have probably prevented tbeir more widespread use for these 
purposes. In this context, this paper sets to examine, in a highly simplified fashion, some 
relations between the population and labor force age structure, economic dependency, and 
per capita income, that may be of help in guiding policy assessments and discussions by 
highlighting some basic accounting restrictions which policy formulation and implementation 
should take into account. Specifically, the relations developed here are used to analyze the 
effects of changes in unemployment, retirement, and fertility on dependency and income; 
some consequences on pension systems are also examined.
The present discussion is simplified in two major respects. On the one hand, it focuses on 
the effects of changing age distributions, and does not explicitly consider those of changes 
of population size in themselves: in spite of the fact that they are related, the following 
examination considers only those effects of population growth expressed in changes of the 
age structure; we do not know of conclusive evidence for the Latin American region 
regarding the influence of the rate of population growth on economic growth. How 
important are the effects of changing age distributions is not clear either, and this paper 
attempts to clarify some basic ideas about how to assess their importance. The second sense 
in which this discussion is simplified, is that no causal interactions are considered between 
the demographic and the economic variables analyzed; we use only the most elementary 
accounting relations between them. This carries with it obvious limitations, but it allows a 
straightforward analysis which, nevertheless, reveals some of the inherent subtleties of the 
subject.
From a policy standpoint, some realism is sacrificed for the sake of simplicity in this paper; 
as explained in following sections, the results shown refer to first-order effects, that may be 
partially offset in the case of unemployment and age at retirement, but most likely be 
reinforced in the case of fertility. The relations presented evidently do not suffice to justify 
particular policies; other considerations may be equally or more relevant as a basis for 
demographic or other social policies (Preston, 1988). Rather, the present analysis is aimed 
at showing the way in which the population and labor force age structure determine the 
range of possible outcomes of alternative changes or actions.
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In tbe first part of the paper some definitions of economic dependency are presented, the 
effects of changes of its demographic and economic components are specified, and a simple 
relation between the dependency ratio and income per person is obtained. Tbe derivations 
carried out subsequently are used to evaluate the impact of'changes in employment, 
retirement and fertility on the dependency ratio and per capita income. Then, the 
repercussions on the financial balance of pension systems are presented. Some basic ideas 
are drawn from the more sophisticated analyses of inter-generational transfers (Arthur & 
McNicoll, 1978; Lee, 1980,1990; Preston, 1982), which are generally more concerned with 
individual lifetime income or consumption. The present focus is on period dependency and 
income for the population as a whole, and ignores the capital dilution effects which are 
taken up in some of the cited studies. In the main text, only a few, more crucial equations 
are presented; all variables and relations are defined and derived in detail in the appendix. 
Six Latin American countries have been selected to illustrate these relations in the real 
context of demographic diversity in the region: the set includes cases of countries in the 
more advanced, intermediate and incipient stages of the demographic transition (Argentina, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru and Bolivia).
Readers not interested in compositional population and labor force considerations, may skip 
to section 2.
1. Economic dependency: definition and components.
Defined at the macro level, the concept of economic dependency, as used here, makes 
reference to the number of persons that must be economically maintained by those who 
generate income. Given that the main source of income of most people is their labor, and 
that there are ages where remunerated work is practically nonexistent (young children and 
the elderly population) a very crude, but very widely used definition of the dependency index 
is the quotient between the number of persons in the extreme ages and the size of the 
working age population. This ratio, here called R„, can be expressed as R tt=(l-o)/c, where 
a is the proportion of the population in the working ages. Given the limiting ages, the value 
of R„ depends on those purely demographic variables that determine the population age 
distribution.
However, the ’demographic burden’ (as it is sometimes called) does not fall on all the 
working age population, but mainly on those responsible for the provision of income, i.e., 
the economically active. This leads to consider a second (also widely used) definition of 
dependency: the ratio of economically inactive to the active population, which may be 
written as R6 = (l-oB)/aB, where B represents the total labor force participation rate (i.e., 
the proportion active among those in working ages). The ILO (1986) estimates and 
projections show that the economically active population is very heterogeneous. It is possible 
to distinguish, in particular, three main sub-groups: the middle-aged adults (roughly those 
between 30 and 55 years of age), who in general have participation rates that are high and 
stable or increasing over time, and the very young (below 30 yean) and older adults (over 
55 years) with low and generally decreasing labor force participation.
i
It follows that the demographic transition, which carries with it the ageing of the population 
over the medium to long terms, has at least two distinguishable effects on dependency: an 
increase in the working-age proportion, which reduces dependency, and on the other hand, 
the ageing of the adult population, that tends to reduce total participation and therefore to 
raise the dependency ratio. To the extent that lower fertility is accompanied by greater 
female labor force participation, the tendency toward a reduced dependency ratio is 
reinforced.
In figure 1 one can see that R B in Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru, after reaching a peak 
around 1970, shows a declining trend afterwards, while in Bolivia it maintains an increasing 
trend which will probably not be reversed for more than a decade. All countries, except for 
Bolivia, may see their dependency ratios stabilize or even start to experience a turnaround 
near the end of the period considered. An algebraic decomposition of R 6, allows us to verify 
(see table 1) that the demographic changes during the last quarter of the present century 
are in general be favorable, in the sense that they combine to reduce the degree of 
dependency, counteracting the sometimes unfavorable effects of the changes in labor force 
participation profiles. The future projections (2000-2025) show that the total ’demographic 
effect’ (the combined effect of increments in the adult proportion and that of ageing of the 
adult population) will turn out to be favorable in the next few decades if current projections 
are realized; i.e., dependency will fall (although in different degrees) as a consequence of 
the projected population trends. All countries, except for Bolivia, are projected to experience 
negative effects of the ageing of the adult population, but they will not be sufficiently large 
to compensate for the favorable ones of reduced child dependency.
2. Dependency and per capita earnings.
Among those in the labor force, only those who work effectively generate the income that 
provides economic support for the whole population. Consequently, it appears useful to 
consider a third, very rarely used measure of dependency, defined as the quotient of the not- 
employed over the number of employed in the population, which can be expressed as
R f = (1-aBe)/oBe (1)
where e represents the employment rate (one minus the unemployment rate) of the labor 
force. A  larger proportion of working-age persons, a greater labor force participation, as 
well as a lower unemployment rate lead to lower dependency, defined in these terms.
If participation rates were high and stable, and the unemployment rates were low and 
relatively constant, the three definitions considered would be practically equivalent But at 
least in the Latin American reality, labor force participation shows persistent trends, and 
unemployment fluctuates widely from one quinquennium to another, and even from one 
year to the next Thus, in the short-run (one to five years), the changes in R, are mainly 
affected by the fluctuations in unemployment, while in the medium and long terms, it is 
determined more by the trends in labor force participation and the population age structure
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(R„ and Rj depend only on the last two factors).
This way of defining the index of dependency allows us to write a simple relation with the 
earnings per person (y):
y = w/(l+R,) (2)
where w  is the mean wage, or earnings per worker. What this equation says is very simple: 
on average, each worker (that earns on average a salary w), divides his or her income 
between him or her self, plus the number of persons -that on average- he or she must 
maintain (R,). Equation 2 represents a clear way of recognizing the inverse relationship that 
exists between dependency and earnings per person, and it allows to compare directly any 
of the above-mentioned effects on R, with those of variations in real wages. Also, it is 
possible to show on the basis of this relation than any given percentage change in the 
dependency ratio will be of a greater relative magnitude that the relative change in per 
capita income (more specifically, in the proportion (1+R,)/R,). In other words, the same 
reasoning and methods used to examine the structural changes in economic dependency may 
be applied to per capita income in all but one respect: the magnitude of relative changes in 
income per person would be magnified considerably, in the best cases by about one third 
(when R, is near 3) and in the worst cases by a factor of 2 (when R, is near 1).
As in the case of R B, it is possible to cany out a decomposition of the effects on income per 
person due to changes in each one of its factors1; we do this in the following section, in the 
context of short run simulations.
3. Simulations on dependency and per capita income.
Will a decline in fertility be beneficial (in terms of reducing dependency and raising income 
per person) for a given countiy? Under what conditions will the result turn out one way or 
the other? How do these effects compare with those of changes in other factors, i.e., 
increases in labor force participation, in active life or reductions in unemployment? Such 
questions are relevant to the assessment of changes in the structural factors of dependency 
and average income, and will be answered in the present section for the selected countries.
The examined changes may be thought of as induced by policy, or more generally, as 
exogenous variations in the given variables. Variables such as the unemployment rate, labor 
force participation and fertility, are affected in turn by more basic determinants (e.g., 
aggregate production, inflation, stabilization and adjustment policies in the case of 
unemployment; education in the case of labor force participation and fertility), and are 
normally specified as endogenous in causal economic models. For the purposes of the 
present decomposition analysis their changes may be interpreted as induced by variations
1 Related, although demographically much simpler decomposition techniques have been applied to examine 
income inequality in Latin American countries (e.g, Altimir & Pinera, 1977; Uthoff & Pollack, 1987).
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in tbe more basic determinants.
In a real policy context, tbe combination of feasible and most convenient actions will vary 
from one country to tbe otber, depending on tbeir initial labor market situation, their 
demographic profiles, and tbe capacity of policy makers to produce, directly or indirectly, 
tbe specified changes in tbe given variables. Initial conditions are to some extent 
incorporated in tbe analysis, because tbe initial structure (as regards to population, fertility, 
labor force, and unemployment) of eacb country is incorporated in tbe specification of each 
simulation and in tbe calculation of tbe effects.
The following derivations (detailed in tbe appendix) are used to calculate the impacts of a 
reduction in unemployment, of the extension of active life, and of fertility reduction; the 
reported results take as a basis the demographic, labor force participation, and 
unemployment conditions observed around 1990. Tbe simulations are specified with a short­
term temporal horizon in mind, (between 0 to 5 years), a time period in which they could 
possibly be made effective. Table 2 summarizes the mathematical results for the elasticity 
(i.e., the percentage change in y in response to a one percent increase in a given variable) 
of per capita earnings with respect to changes in the three mentioned variables, while figure 
2 summarizes the results of the three simulations, that are discussed in some detail next
(al The effect of a reduction in unemployment. Expressed in terms of discrete differentials 
(denoted by A), the changes in R t and y due to a percent change in unemployment (Ji) are 
obtained by differentiating equations (1) and (2):
In the simulations, a reduction of 50%  in the unemployment rate with respect to the 1990 
value in each country is assumed2. It is useful to remember that the present simulation, as 
well as the following ones, are caeteris paribus', they change one variable at a time, while all 
others are held constant at their initial values. In the particular case of unemployment 
reduction, fertility, salaries and tbe labor force participation schedule are unchanged, so that 
the simulation can be thought of as a government employment creation policy in an excess 
labor supply context, where the additional supply of jobs is met by a given number of 
(previously unemployed) laborers without changing the equilibrium wage.
The results suggest that Bolivia and Peru, which had large unemployment rates around 1990,
AR, = (1+R> ft (3)
Ay = -_lL.p
y (M)
(4)
 ̂different age patterns lor tbe change in fi could be specified; a global change was chosen here since 
this simulation is intended to serve only as a basis for comparison with the rest.
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can expect significant effects (between 4 and 6.5 per cent) on mean earnings. Somewhat 
lower would be the effects in Argentina, Chile and Costa Rica (around 3.4 per cent), while 
in Mexico it is very reduced (below 2 per cent). These estimated effects are less stable in 
time than those for a and £, due to the greater sbort-run volatility of unemployment rates.
fbi The effect of an extension of active life. Many of the Latin American countries are 
starting to manifest financial problems in their social security systems (Mesa-Lago, 1989, 
1991), which are often accentuated by the increase of life expectancy and by the reduction 
in the mean age at retirement The demographic factors are, more often than not, of 
secondary importance compared to the effects of the severe recent economic crises, but they 
constitute a non-negligible element of the problem, particularity with regard to its medium 
to long term trends. In some countries the legal age at retirement has been raised, and in 
some others legislation aimed at that objective (or more strictly enforcing existing 
regulations) is being considered. The repercussions on the financial balance of pension 
systems are presented in the next section; the potential of increasing per capita income is 
examined here.
The magnitude of the positive effect of extending the length of active life on dependency 
and average income, depends on the way in which a given number of additional active years 
are distributed over the life cycle. Three alternative types are illustrated in figure 3. In the 
simplest case (case 1), where participation rates increase in a constant proportion at all ages, 
per capita income rises in the same proportion as active life. If the increase in active years 
is tilted toward older ages (case 2) the impact on per capita earnings is somewhat lower. For 
conaeteness, in the case where the force of retirement is reduced by a fixed amount at all 
ages (and the force of entry into the labor force increases in the same constant quantity),
AR,= -(1+R,)Al M  (5)A S
and
Ay = A lM  (6)
y A  s
where S is the (expected) number of working years, and where A l and Á L denote the 
average ages of the labor force in the population and in the reference stationary population, 
respectively. Since in a growing population A L is lower than Â u the ratio A¡JAL is less than 
one, and the effect is therefore smaller than in the first case. The reason is that a given 
increase in labor force participation is applied with greater intensity to an age segment that 
has relatively little weight in the population. Finally, if participation rates increase 
proportionately more at younger ages, and less at older ages (case 3), then the effect could 
be substantially higher3, the reason being that the increase in participation occurs more
3 As shown is the appendix, this case implies that: 
èsï -/q-a,m
y (O-AjJ S where 0 is the oldest age at which significant labor force participation is detected, which
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heavely on the age groups that have the greatest proportional weight in the working age 
population.
For the present simulation, active life is assumed to increase in two years, an amount 
equivalent to less than 10 per cent of the values observed around 1990. Case 2, expressed 
in equations (5) and (6), represents more closely the scenario of increasing the average age 
at retirement; this is the case used for the reporting of effects in figure 2. The results show 
relatively uniform effects, of a larger overall magnitude than in the unemployment 
simulation: between 7 and 8 per cent in Argentina, Chile, Bolivia and Peru, and around 6.5 
per cent in Mexico and Costa Rica. It is interesting to note, however, that a similar effect 
in Argentina and Bolivia is obtained for different reasons and under very different 
demographic conditions: in Argentina the large effect is due to its closer proximity to 
stationarity (producing a large h-jh.L elasticity) while in Bolivia, in spite of its younger age 
structure, the mean lenght of active life was low to start with, and therefore the percentage 
change in active life represented by the same two years is relatively large (a similar contrast 
can be made between Chile on the one hand, and Peru on the other).
Evidently, the above relations could serve as well to figure out the extent of decline in per 
capita income as a result of reductions in S, should governmental intervention to the 
contrary fail, and trends toward earlier retirement continue.
fcl The effect of a reduction in fertility. A  reduction of fertility4 produces a greater 
proportion of the population in working ages, and with a time lag, a lower proportion of the 
young among the adults. In the Latin American countries, the net effect tends to be a 
reduction of dependency (as illustrated in figure 1) and therefore to increase average 
income, but depends in general on the repercussions on all the components in equation 1.
Precise formulae for the effect of a change in fertility on dependency and per capita income 
in an arbitrary population can be obtained on the basis of B. Arthur’s (1984) 'linkage 
method’. However, the approximations derived for reference stable populations used here, 
can be more more readily compared with the previous expressions, and are good enough for 
the purposes of this analysis. They can be written as:
AR( = ( l  + R .XA^JAm  (7)
An m
can be taken to be around 70 for most Latin American countries. The ratio (O-AJ/fO-ÀJ is greater than 1 in 
growing populations, so in all countries in the region, the elasticity is greater than in the proportional*increase 
case.
4 For an interesting discussion of the effects of mortality decline (not taken up here) on the population age 
structure and lifetime consumption, see Lee, 1990.
'-(A,^A) + (A.^Aj]âm (8)
K  A. J m
child ageing of
dependency working age 
reduction effect population effect
which can be simplified to a result that resembles tbe well known ’intergenerational transfer 
effect’ on lifetime welfare as it appears, for example, in Arthur &  McNicoll (1978, 244) or 
Lee (1980, 1134):s
Ax = 'ÍAisAà Am (8’)
y K  m
where m  = the birth rate (i.e., the population-weighted mean fertility level), A  = the 
average age of the population, A,+ = the average age of the working age population (aged 
a and older), A^ = the average age of childbearing, with all values referred to the reference 
stable population. The first term of equation (8) is an approximation of the short-term effect 
of fertility change, which is always negative, since the mean age of the working age 
population (i.e., those aged a and older) is by necessity larger than that of the total 
population. The more substantive reason is that in the short term, lower fertility brings 
about a reduction in child dependency and therefore a proportionate increase in the working 
age population, leaving unaltered the age composition of the labor force. This component 
may thus be termed the ’child dependency reduction’ effect
The second term reflects the effect of ageing of the adults that starts to be manifested only 
after 20 years or so, which can be positive or negative. In aged populations with moderate 
to low mean age of the labor force, lowered fertility twists the age distribution in the 
direction of the people that have the lowest activity rates, and per capita earnings are 
reduced, while the converse outcome could occur in an opposite situation. Thus the total 
long-run effect can be positive or negative, depending on the balance of the two 
components: in high fertility countries, where the total population is young compared to 
those in the the labor force, a reduction in fertility will increase per capita earnings, and 
vice-versa. Estimates of the relevant average ages for tbe calculation of both the short and 
the long term effects appear in table 3.
This last result has some relation with that well known from inter-generational transfers 
analyses, that implies that whether individual lifetime welfare improves or not as a result 
of a reduction in fertility depends on whether income flows are on average ’downward’ or 
’upward’; i.e., whether consumption occurs on average at younger ages than production.
Ax = 
y
5 Also, a result similar to that of equation (S') for changes in the stable growth rate is found in Preston, 1982, 
257, which can be worked out directly, whithout the intermediate step of equation S. The present derivation, 
obtained for changes in fertility, uses a relation given in Arthur, 1984,115.
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Beyond the apparent similarity, what should stand out is the key difference between them: 
the welfare effect depends on the difference between the mean age of production and that 
of consumption, whereas the period income effect takes the difference with respect to the 
mean age of the population. Both numbers could coincide, for example, in the special case 
where the consumption age schedule is flat (consumption is the same at all ages), but in 
general they may differ. To the extent that they do, no necessary relationship holds between 
the changes in per capita income and in lifetime welfare; in principle, there may be cases 
where per capita income is raised while welfare deteriorates as a result of a reduction in 
fertility, and vice-versa. Whether both variables will move in the same or in opposite 
directions depends on an empirical issue, that must be settled by measuring the relevant 
mean ages in particular contexts.
For this simulation, we take the changes of fertility between 1985-90 and 1990-95, based on 
CELADE's ’low” fertility projections of each country. These values were adopted with the 
idea of specifying a reduction of an amount close to the limit to which fertility could 
reasonably be expected to fall in each country during the next five years. The reported 
results correspond to the short term (i.e., child dependency reduction) effect only; the long 
term effect can be easily calculated from the data in table 3. As expected, some high fertility 
countries, i.e., Mexico and Peru, show the greatest potential from fertility reduction, with 
effects above 5.5 per cent. Argentina, Chile and Costa Rica display changes below 3 per 
cent Bolivia is a case of high fertility combined with a small expected fertility decline, thus 
its moderately low fertility effect (3.4 per cent).
Under the current demographic and labor force participation conditions, all countries (see 
table 3 for the relevant mean ages) have working age populations that are older than their 
respective labor force, and thus show unfavorable adult ageing effects (second term of 
equation 8). These latter effects, however, are relatively small and are not sufficient to 
compensate the favorable short term child dependency reduction effects. Both in the short 
and longer term, there are important differences in the degree to which a given fertility 
decline would improve per capita income: the changes tend to be substantial in high fertility 
(young age structure) countries and very reduced in countries with lower fertility (older 
populations).
Two further points are worth stressing. First, the present ’ageing’ estimates are conservative 
since they implicitely assume that productivity and consumption do not vary with age; to the 
extent that older people consume more (e.g., due to more onerous health expenditures), 
these would be more important, and perhaps dominant More precise measurements of 
these factors could be made in countries where appropriate data exist i.e., age profiles of 
productivity and consumption, including public transfers (see Lee, 1988, 1990). Secondly, 
’ageing’ is essentially relative in this context: a population can be labeled ’old’ or ’young’ 
only in relation to the timing and intensity of labor force participation by age. For example, 
Peru has a slightly older population age distribution than Bolivia, but has also an older age 
profile of economic activity, so the ’ageing’ effects turn out to be very similar in both 
countries; the comparison between contemporary Cuba and Argentina offers an example of
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two countries with very similar population age structure but different labor force age 
schedules, where ’ageing1 effects consequently differ.
4. Repercussions on pension systems. '
Some of the relations, and the general approach used here, may be extended in many 
directions. A  natural application, and a relevant one to the countries under study, is to 
transfer pension systems with partial or no funding, which are the norm in the Latin 
American region. Typically, the analyses of demographic factors in pension systems assume 
an equilibrium of the system's income (or ’contributions1) with respect to expenditures 
(’pensions1). This is rarely the case even in transfer schemes that are actuarially balanced; 
most partially-funded systems are designed to obtain the actuarial balance over a given 
period of time precisely by contemplating a period of financial surplus, followed by one of 
deficit. Also, systems with no funding also experience imbalances in practice due to 
economic fluctuations. W e  admit the possibility of temporary (negative or positive) financial 
imbalances by specifying the deficit (D) of a pension system in any given period of time, 
expressed as a fraction of contributions, as:
where <t> is the ratio of the average pension over the mean salary contribution by the 
economically active, and R  is the ratio of the (eligible) retired population to the labor force 
in the system (the balanced budget case is a particular one where <|>R = 1). It is clear form 
equation 9 that as long as <t> remains constant in time, any change in R  will be transmitted 
on a one-to-one basis, in percentage terms, to the system’s deficit.
The question now is how do changes in the population age structure and in retirement age 
would affect R, and thus the financial balance of the system. Requirements for eligibility to 
receive pension benefits normally include both a minimum number of active contributory 
years and a minimum legal age at retirement The number of compulsory contributory yean 
is a binding restriction in most Latin American countries only for a small fraction of 
workers, since it typically varies from 10 to 15 yean (IDB, 1991, 234-281), which is far less 
than what most people work over their lifetimes. Nonetheless, if the lenght of active life 
increases, either spontaneously (e.g., as a result of greater female labor force participation) 
or in response to legal requirements, the ratio of the retired to the active population will 
fall and the financial deficit will be reduced in an amount given by
D  = <f>R - 1 (9)
A D  = -1 + Rr AS (10)
if activity rates increase in the same proportion at all ages (case 1), where R, is the ratio 
of the inactive to the economically active among those in pensionable ages. The change is 
given by
if tbe increase in participation rates is titited toward the older ages (case 2), where is 
the mean age of those in pensionable ages that are still economically active. By use of the 
same assumptions as in the preceding section, a simulation of an increase in two years of 
active life was carried out, giving results consistent with tbe previous simulation on per 
capita income in the sense that the effects are relatively uniform, ranging form a potential 
of a 9 per cent reduction of the deficit in Argentina, to 14 per cent in Bolivia.
Changes in the minimum (legal) age at retirement are, at least in principle, under more 
direct governmental control. The rationale for increasing the legal age at retirement (or at 
any rate, for tbe attempts at it) is precisely that it is needed to improve the financial balance 
of the system; the more so when the gradual, but persistent population ageing trends are 
contemplated within a given planning period. Instead of inquiring separately about the 
impacts of changes in the population age distribution and in the legal age at retirement, we 
pose a single question that integrates both aspects; How much would the legal age at 
retirement have to increase to compensate for the projected population ageing? Purely 
numerical computer calculations can be made, but an analytical expression obtained for the 
reference stable populations, is also useful for gaining some insight into the factors that 
affect the results. Letting r be the (stable) intrinsic rate of natural increase and z the legal 
age at retinnent, the required change in the age at retirement can be written as
Az = -4>(r,z) (A,, - A jA r (11)
where <t(r,z) is the ratio of the economically active in pensionable ages over the inactive at 
age z in the reference stable population, and is the average age of retirees6. A 30-year 
population projection (1990-2020) suggests that in order to compensate only for population 
ageing during this period, tbe legal age at retirement would have to increase between 0 and 
3 years in Bolivia and Argentina, and between 5 and 10 in Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru7. 
The required changes are significant in most countries, except for Bolivia (which will 
experience a transitory adult population rejuvenation), and are clearly impractical in the last 
three; in these countries, other measures will have to be used in combination with 
retirement age requirements if the deficit is not to worsen further.
This result bears a close resemblance to that related to promotion in stable organizations due to Keyfitz (1985, pp. 107 & 108). By reinterpreting tbe ratio of high-rank to lower-rank workers as our R, and the age at promotion as that of retirement, it becomes dear that the two problems have basically the same form.
7 the calculations assume that the remaining parameters (labor force participation, social security tax, mean level of wages in relation to pensions, coverage of the system) maintain their current levels. Chile is exduded from these calculations since its current private, fully funded capitalization system does not fit into this particular specification.
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A reduction in unemployment, a prolongation of active life, and a reduction in fertility, all 
tend to reduce economic dependency and to increase earnings per capita. In general, the 
magnitude of tbe first two, and both the size and direction of the third of these effects 
depend on the population and the labor force age distribution. Here, these basic relations 
are formally expressed, and a decomposition of the changes in dependency and income due 
to each one of their demographic and economic component elements is carried out, and 
compared across six Latin American countries.8 The simulations suggest that changes in 
unemployment, active life and fertility can have a significative impact on dependency and 
per capita income, which varies according to the country’s initial population, fertility, and 
labor force age structure. The favorable effects are not obtained without costs: resources 
must be obtained to increment employment, higher incomes are obtained at the cost of 
more lifetime work effort when retirement is postponed, and lowered fertility, if continued 
in the longer run, may eventually produce some larger negative effects. On the other hand, 
changes in the extension of active life and fertility bave a more stable character than those 
in employment and salaries, which at least in Latin America, have displayed great volatility 
in tbe past.
It is noted that a change in fertility need not affect total lifetime consumption in the same 
way as per capita income, so the use of the latter as a welfare index is to be taken with 
caution even when no other caveats apply. The analysis suggests that most of the countries 
of the region have not yet reached the stage where small reductions in fertility would be 
clearly detrimental to dependency and per capita income, although negative adult ageing 
affects are detected in all of them in varying degrees. The unfavorable aspects of ageing 
trends are more evident regarding tbeir repercussions on tbe financial balance of pension 
systems, where the present results indicate that the required compensatory changes in the 
legal age at retirement in some countries will be very difficult to attain in practice, and 
therefore complementary measures are needed if the financial balance is not to deteriorate 
further.
5. Summaiy and Conclusion.
The foregoing decomposition exercises, as noted before, hold everything else constant; Le, give an idea of fust-order effects only. How would the conclusions change if interactions were allowed to take place? Lacking actual measurements, theoretical considerations are of some help. Regarding an increase in active life, there may be three additional effects: a rise in unemployment rates and some reduction in wages in response to the increased labor supply, and a reduction in fertility, if some of the increased participation is of women. These should be of a relatively small magnitude and will act in opposite directions, so that the first-order effect would most Ekely dominate, although it could be diminished to some extent An exogenous reduction in unemployment may ioduce a short-term increase in births, which is likely to be small in comparison to its medium-term trend, but would nonetheless tend to ameliorate the positive first-order effect A reduction in fertility, on the other hand, would tend to increase the labor force participation of women, which would directly contribute to augment per capita income. Indirectly and with a time lag, higher incomes and more intense female labor force participation may further reduce fertility, so that re-enforcing effects should be expected beyond the short term.
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Table 1. Changes in the dependency ratio R̂  due to changes in the age 
structure and in labor force participation rates
Argentina changes in RB due to:
a______ cfxl Bfxl
1950-1975
1975-2000
2000-2025
-0.048
-0.075
-0.138
0.122
0.077
0.040
0.021
0.048
-0.027
Chile changes in R¿ due to:
a cfxl Bfxl
1950-1975
1975-2000
2000-2025
0.004
-0.360
-0.217
0.043
-0.018
0.183
0.075
0.113
-0.049
Costa Rica changes in Re due to:
a cfxl Bfxl
1950-1975
1975-2000
2000-2025
-0.065
-0.556
-0.332
-0.028
0.015
0.164
0.062
0.084
-0.052
Mexico changes in Rj due to:
a cfx) Bfxl
1950-1975 0.172 0.022 -0.097
1975-2000 -0.913 -0.045 -0.085
2000-2025 -0.318 0.106 -0.070
Peru changes in RB due to:
a cfxl Bfxl
1950-1975
1975-2000
2000-2025
0.091
-0.574
-0.407
0.014
■0.040
0.038
0.107
0.130
-0.061
Bolivia changes in RB due to:
a cfxl Bfxl
1950-1975
1975-2000
2000-2025
0.060
0.023
-0.415 -
0.015
0.001
•0.Q29
0.093
0.105
-0.047
Note: a = proportion of the population in working ages (15 and over); c(x) = working age 
population age distribution; B(x) = labor force participation rates by age (x); Rs = 
dependency ratio, defined as the quotient of the inactive over the economically active. The 
decomposition is based on the total differentiation of RB:
dRj = -(1+RS) da + J_[EAc(x)fi(x) + 2 AB(x)c(x)l 
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Table 2. Elasticity of per capita earnings with respect to 
changes in unemployment, active life, and fertility.
Unemployment -u < 0
(If0
Lenght of Active Life
(a) proportional at all ages: 1
(b) tilted toward old: A¡_yAL < 1
(c) tilted toward young: Ífl-A l > 1
(q a 5
Fertility
(a) child dependency reduction: -CA,, - A) < 0
An
(b) aging of adult population: (A, , • AL) ^ 0
An
(c) total effect: -(AL - A) ^ 0
An
Notation:
H = unemployment rate 
A = average age of the population 
Al  = average age of the labor force
ÀL = average age of the labor force in the reference stationary population 
A ,+ = average age of the working-age population (aged a and older)
= average age at childbearing 
Q = oldest age of labor force participation
The values involved in the fertility elasticities correspond to the reference stable population. 
For the derivations, see the appendix.
Table 3. Estimated average ages around 1990.
Tbe mean ages are of: the population (A); the working age population (AJ+); childbearing 
(AJ; the labor force (AJ; the labor force in the reference stationary population (ÂjJ
A A.1 K K
Argentina 31.5 412 27.1 36.2 38.0
Chile 27.9 38.7 26.4 35.8 38.8
Costa Rica 24.1 36.4 25.8 33.8 39.5
Mexico 23.4 35.7 26.9 33.9 39.7
Peru 24.0 36.0 27 S 35.6 40.9
Bolivia 23.2 35.2 28.2 34.2 39.5
Source: CELADE (1988, 1989, 1990), and ILO (1986)
Figure 1. Dependency ratio R(b)* 
6 Latin American countries, 1950 -2025
R(b)
Year
— ~ Argentina — l~ Chile Costa Rica
•-B- Mexico — Peru Bolivia
* defined as the ratio of the inactive over the economically 
active. Source: C E L A D E  (1990), ILO (1986).
Figure 2.
Simulated effects of changes in u, S, m 
on per capita income (circa 1990)
percentage change in y 101 10
argentina CMfs Cesta Rica Mscfea Peru Bolivit
BSunempieymeflt fcMi aettva Ills  fe rtility
V ariab les;
u • unem ploym ent rate 
S ■ number o f econom ica lly  active years 
m * mean a g e -sp e c ific  fe r t i l i t y
The age p ro file s  as o f 1990 are taken as a basis fo r ca lcu la tio n s  
The s im u la tions are-.a 50% reduction  in the unemployment rate, 
an increase of 2 years in the mean age at re tirem ent, and a 
re d u c tio n  in f e r t i l i t y  according to CELADE ’ lo w ' p ro je c tio n  
in each co u n try  (see text for fu r th e r  de ta ils ).
F ig ur e  3.
Life-cycle changes in activity rates
labor força participation ratas, p(x)
Age (years)
 p(x)  casa 1  casa 2  casa 3
(proportional) (oidar) (younger)
In case 1, activity rates increase in the same proportion at 
all ages; in case 2 participation rates increase more at 
older ages, and in case 3 the increase in more tilted toward 
the younger ages.
Appendix
Notation and basic definitions.
Let:
P * the size of the population 
N * the working*ege population 
L * the size of the labor force 
E * nuaber of employed persons
V « average earnings per worker
Y ■ wE * total earnings
a  * N/P * proportion of the population in working-ages
I * L/N * total labor force participation rate
c * E/L « (1-s) * ««ployaient rate, with p = the una^loyment rate
y  « Y/P « income (or more strictly, 'earnings) per capita.
Dependency ratio R and oer capita income y.
R. * (P-E)/E • (P/P-E/P)/(E/P). Since E/P « (E/L) tl/W W/P) * cSa,
Per capita income is:
y  * Y/P * wE/(fP-E)+E) ■ w(E/E)/([P*E1/E ♦ E/E>
(2)
which can also be written as wo&c.
Effects of a change in the unemployment ratio (a).
Expressed in tenas of discrete differentials (denoted by A), the changes in R. and y  are obtained by 
differentiating equations (1) and (2), and using the fact that A< » -Ap:
y <i-a> *
Effects of a change in the n m b c r  of active years (S).
In any given population with population density function N, and labor force participation function p., the total 
labor force participation rate is
Let S • the (expected) m a t e r  of economically active years, for a cohort (or a stationary population) with 
survivorship function l„ defined for exact age x.
Consider an increase in the n m b e r  of active yeers equal to dS, that corresponds to sn increment in labor force 
participation for each age x, of an amount dp,. There are infinitely many possible life-cycle changes in p, that 
could match a given dS; a few general types sre considered next. In general, the derivations raly on the 
following equalities: 
dR, *
dS dft dk dS
dy * j&'âÊ-dk 
dS d» dk d$
where ft and S are function* of a parameter k. from equations (1) and (2), it can be deduced that dl./d6**(1+R.)/B 
and dy/dftsy/ft. Only tt/dk and dk/ds remain to be determined.
AR. « â í l i È J Â ê  (Va) a
L t * - A  - ¿I
where j is the y o wgest working age.
Cmse 1. If p.* * (1+k)p,, S* « Jl,(1+k>Ffcdx, so
dS * S, and similarity dft * ft. Substituting in the above expressions for dR,/dS and dy/dS,
A.R, « -CVHOAS
S
kCC * AS y s
- Ut,dk Ja
Casc 2. If p.* * p.e*’, s* * Jt«p,e“ dx
xt,p^“ dx • A s, evaluated at k»0, litera
EW EpA  * I x l ^ d x /  |l.pudx ia the mean age of the labor force in the reference stationary population.This result is analogous to the affect of an increase in the force of Mortality 
on life expectancy at birth (Keyfitz, 1985, p. 62). Similarity,
jjB ■ A > ,  again evaluated at k»0, and where A  i* the mean age of the labor force in that population,
dk Substituting as in ease 1 leads to:
AA * -<1*A>Al AS (5)A s
A»! * At AS y As
Case 3. If p,* * pke"<<*‘*)'*>>, where 0  is the oldest ege of labor force participation,
S* * I LA eh',*'"'",dx
dS* » I(Q*x)lÆ-dx « (Q*A.)-S. evaluated at k»0. 
dk
d| « B(Q-A. 1. also evaluated at k*0. Thus, 
dk 0
* *(1+R.)ifiiAJ. AS (û-A) s
Ay * , ¿Sy <û*A> s
Effects of s chance in fertility (stable population).
In a stable population, the proportion of the population in working-eges is:
■JW E-
where r is the (stable) rate of natural increse. A change in r, of an amount dr, induced by a change in the age* 
specific fertility rates of an amount eta (result derived in Arthur, 1984, p. 115), is dr «  (1/inA.)dn, where 
■  is the birth rate and A. the mean age of chi ((bearing in the stable population. Taking the derivative of a 
with respect to r end using the above expression for dr,
Aa * -(A..- A)a¿m 
Am m
where A^  and A denote the mean age of the population aged a and older, and of the total population respectively. 
By a similar process, the change in B induced by a change in ■  is obtained as:
AB » (A~ - A. )BAm. and thus 
A* «
AR, ■ M - H I W A.» A )Am (7)
A. ■
Using the fact that dy/y * [(1/a)£a/£m ♦ (1/B)£B/£m}*<ta,
Aï * r-<Â-A> ♦ XA-lâJl àS 
y L A. A. J ■
which sieplifies to
Aï * -(A- A) £■ (8')
y  A. a
(8)
